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Pandemic events, such as coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-
19), affect health and economics at national and international 
scales, but in the United States, health care delivery and pub-
lic health practice occur at the local level. Transmission con-
trol and eventual economic recovery require detailed 
guidance for communities, cities, metropolitan areas, and 
states. Our recent experience as consultants on the control 
and reopening plans for the city of Indianapolis and Marion 
County, Indiana, illustrated challenges with national plans, 
highlighted fundamental tensions in identifying the best 
course for policy, and emphasized gaps in the evidence base 
and our public health resources.1-4
National Response and Reopening Plans 
Cannot Be Adopted Wholesale
To develop our recommendations to local public health lead-
ers, we first turned to existing reopening plans for guidance as 
basic frameworks. The most prominent plans from think tanks 
and research groups like the American Enterprise Institute 
(AEI),5 the Center for American Progress (CAP),6 and others 
were helpful resources for conceptualizing thresholds for 
action and potential response options. We also reviewed the 
White House plan,7 given its media coverage and potential 
influence on the expectations of the public, business leaders, 
and local politicians. In taking on the formidable (and laud-
able) task of addressing a national problem, no one national 
plan can be specific enough or feasible for local implementa-
tion. The devil is definitely in the details, and the details left to 
local decision makers are not minor.
A key feature of reopening plans is meeting disease trans-
mission thresholds or community levels at which risk is in bal-
ance with further steps toward reopening, such as a sustained 
downward trajectory of cases. The most obvious and first 
question we faced was, “What do ‘trajectory’7 and ‘sustained’5 
mean?” The plans we reviewed did not provide detailed defini-
tions for appropriate thresholds, nor do any definitions readily 
exist in published literature. Translating such terms into action-
able measures is difficult, but it is further complicated by the 
need to arrive at a definition that is acceptable among diverse 
audiences. For health and public health professionals steeped 
in data and statistics, these terms are worse than meaningless—
they convey direction but are undefinable. Moreover, reporting 
delays, testing availability, and various methodologies for cal-
culating positivity rates further limit definitive answers. At the 
same time, these measures are subject to interpretation by the 
public. Anyone with internet access can find out if cases, hos-
pitalizations, or deaths from COVID-19 in their area are “going 
down.”8 This tension between various audiences’ perceptions 
of improvement in COVID-19 transmission at the community 
level is left to local leaders to navigate.
In addition, linear plans are easy to communicate because 
they provide a clear sense of direction, but they break down 
quickly once assumptions are challenged. Included in 
national and many state plans is the substitution of stay- at- 
home orders (and nonessential business limitations) for more 
widespread testing and contact tracing as the primary trans-
mission control strategies. Testing and tracing are sound 
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public health strategies, but what is the alternative if the nec-
essary amount9 of adequate testing and contact tracing is not 
being achieved?
Applying one estimate of the rate of contact tracers 
required to keep up with new cases in Indianapolis would 
suggest the need to test more than 7000 people per day.10 
Testing without accompanying contact tracing should not be 
expected to achieve the desired outcome. On April 29, 2020, 
Indiana announced a plan to hire 500 contact tracers11—a 
welcome and needed addition to an understaffed public 
health workforce.4 Despite the increases in bachelor’s- level 
and master’s- level graduates trained in public health during 
the past 2 decades and the introduction of programs such as 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Public 
Health Associates Program,12,13 budget cuts in public health 
have reduced the size of the workforce rather than increased 
it.14,15 The Association of State and Territorial Health 
Officials estimates that Indiana needs 4 times the number of 
contact tracers the state is planning to hire.16 Although states 
and localities are grappling with the logistics of achieving 
these testing and contact- tracing goals, what do public health 
professionals do if these capacities are not in place? 
According to the guidance of national plans, including those 
of AEI, CAP, and the White House, a jurisdiction should not 
move forward with reopening. At the time of writing in mid- 
May, only North Dakota had met all transmission thresholds 
and public health infrastructure required to reopen,17 yet sev-
eral states had lifted many nonessential business restrictions. 
Opening locations where social distancing is difficult (eg, 
bars, entertainment venues) will likely challenge the existing 
contact- tracing infrastructure, because these settings were 
associated with previous outbreaks of COVID-19.18
Also, the national plans by AEI and CAP did not, and 
likely could not, account for limitations in policy options 
that resulted from widely differential public health responses. 
Pressure to reopen can overwhelm local public health lead-
ers, regardless of their capacity to test and trace contacts. 
Specifically, the authority of local public health jurisdictions 
to continue stay- at- home policies may not be feasible in light 
of public disapproval, which may intensify as neighboring 
states reopen, the federal government encourages reopening, 
compliance with social- distancing measures is inconsis-
tent,19 and the state government moves forward with acceler-
ated reopening guidance. Multiple cities (and counties) were 
in conflict with their own states concerning the strength of 
public health protections and were subsequently pushed into 
more widespread reopening.20,21 Effective policy requires 
the identification of feasible alternatives, even if that set of 
alternatives is limited. For example, in the absence of having 
full capacity to test and contact trace all COVID-19 cases, 
extending the number of days required to meet a “sustained 
downward trajectory,” as outlined in the AEI, CAP, and 
White House reopening guidance, may be necessary. When 
pressure to reopen mounts, other strategies may be required, 
such as instituting random sample testing22 or increasing 
enforcement of business compliance with evidence- based 
public health measures. In addition, the easing of restrictions 
on gathering sizes may also need to be delayed. Our team 
generated several such strategies in an effort to allow public 
health infrastructure to gain a foothold in reducing the trans-
mission of COVID-19 and to ensure that the impact of eas-
ing restrictions was sufficiently monitored.
Reconciling the Irreconcilable
COVID-19 may be remembered as the disaster that created 
the zero- sum game between public health and the economy, 
at least for some policy makers.23 The economy has been 
negatively affected: consumer spending decreased after stay- 
at- home orders were issued in March 2020.24 Both economic 
and health needs of communities are real. In the United 
States, more than 200 000 people had died because of 
COVID-19 as of September 2020.25 At the same time, the 
US unemployment rate more than quadrupled from January 
to March 2020, and although initial unemployment claims 
have fallen from the peak of 7 million per week, nearly 16 
million people in the United States remain unemployed.26 
Any response and reopening plan must be attentive to 
COVID-19’s threats to health and financial well- being.
For public health professionals, attention to health is nat-
ural. Attention to broader economics, however, may not be 
top of mind for public health professionals. (ie, none of the 
10 essential public health services concerns personal 
finances).27 As such, any public health–driven plan has the 
potential to inadvertently give inadequate attention to eco-
nomic issues and needs. We found that considering issues of 
equity highlighted the need for a balanced approach that is 
attentive to both health assurance and business opportunities. 
Public health professionals understand the role of social 
needs and determinants as they relate to health. The cascad-
ing negative health effects from unemployment and a lack of 
financial resources28 emphasize the need for policies that 
alleviate individual needs.
Other points of conflict are not so easy to reconcile. For 
example, individuals, businesses, and political leaders do not 
like ambiguity and uncertainty and, thus, many state plans 
set specific reopening target dates. Setting target dates for 
recovery meets the demand for clarity and offers reassurance 
of a return to some form of normalcy. However, the preva-
lence of asymptomatic carriers of COVID-19 and the extent 
of transmission are still unknown across most of the United 
States. Date- driven decision making is almost irreconcilable 
with data- driven decision making.
Dates anchor public and stakeholder expectations and, 
once set, are difficult to change. Postponing these dates, or 
reversing previous decisions to extend dates, becomes 
increasingly infeasible and potentially damaging because the 
public is less likely to follow the restrictions when messag-
ing is not clear or consistent. When cases surge, dates must 
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change. Failure to meet expectations erodes trust in leader-
ship, which may lead to poor adherence to crucial public 
health guidance.29 Herein lies the fundamental problem.
Given the structure of the public health system, multiple 
and conflicting approaches to public health policy are inevi-
table. Despite pledges to coordinate reopening phases,30 
neighboring states are taking different approaches to disease 
control and economic recovery. Even within states, commu-
nities have socioeconomic geographies and networks that 
extend far past any single public health department’s politi-
cally defined jurisdictions. People commute to work or travel 
to shopping centers. Some metropolitan areas span multiple 
states. Patients seek care across city and county limits.
Public health policy should reflect the intertwining of 
economics and society. Without the formalization of regional 
approaches to the public health system, public health leaders 
rely on post hoc collaboration or worse: pitting city, regional, 
and state policies against each other and creating confusion 
among the public.
The Evidence Base for Policy Formulation
An abundance of relevant information is available to support 
evidence- based policy making for local recovery planning. 
Through open- access policies, key information from current and 
past epidemics sheds light on incubation periods, the effective-
ness of nontherapeutic interventions, and guidance for ensuring 
the health of institutional residents. Furthermore, expert opinions 
help fill in gaps. However, several issues are thorny:
• How many contacts can one disease investigator 
manage in a day?
• How many uninvestigated contacts or cases should 
indicate an insufficient public health response?
• How do we account for substantial changes in testing 
strategies (ie, health care workers only, to those with 
symptoms, or the general population) in establishing 
benchmarks for decision making?
• Does infection confer immunity?
Answers to such questions could reduce uncertainty about 
decision thresholds, staffing issues, and testing strategies. 
Moreover, how should the quality of the evidence be assessed? 
New research and data are coming out at a furious pace, but 
so are the retractions31 and shifts in expert opinion. The role 
of face coverings in public is a key example.32 We attempt to 
mitigate this risk by relying on findings from high- quality and 
high- impact scientific journals, but sometimes policy makers 
need a number or a date. When faced with no answer or a best 
guess, a best guess is the only choice.
Public Health Implications
A 2009 New York Times article opined, “America seems to 
have dodged a bullet with the swine flu epidemic, yet this 
was more the result of the virus being less deadly than feared 
rather than of any government coordination. Despite billions 
spent since 9/11, we are still not well prepared to react to 
disease outbreaks, terrorist attacks and natural disasters.”33 
More than 10 years later, coordination and preparedness 
remain challenging, and this time, we are not dodging the 
bullet. Local public health leaders and scientists have a duty 
to put forth data- driven recommendations to ensure the pub-
lic’s health and well- being.34 However, national plans do not 
provide easy answers, and there are no viable off- the- shelf 
solutions for this disaster. The Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention’s wisdom was unavailable during critical 
times and is now arriving too late. Ultimately, the success of 
quarantine, isolation, social distancing, testing practices, 
surge capacity, contact tracing, face coverings in public, and 
a litany of other measures depends on strong voices by local 
public health leaders to influence local policy makers.
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